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The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection
Gary Lawson*
Guy I. Seidman**
Robert G. Natelson***
Abstract
In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Supreme Court invalidated school
segregation in the District of Columbia by inferring a broad “federal
equal protection” principle from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. It is often assumed that this principle is inconsistent
with the Constitution’s original meaning and with “originalist”
interpretation.
This Article demonstrates, however, that a federal equal
protection principle is not only consistent with the Constitution’s
original meaning, but inherent in it. The Constitution was crafted as a
fiduciary document of the kind that, under contemporaneous law,
imposed on agents acting for more than one beneficiary—and on
officials serving the general public—a well-established duty to serve all
impartially. The Constitution, like other fiduciary instruments,
imposes a standard of equal treatment from which lawmakers and
officials cannot depart without reasonable cause. Although the
Constitution’s original meaning does not precisely define the answers
to all “equal protection” cases, and does not necessarily prescribe
norms identical to those of existing equal protection jurisprudence, it
clearly does prohibit racial discrimination of the kind at issue in
Bolling.
Bolling v. Sharpe1 and McCulloch v. Maryland2 are both iconic cases in
American constitutional history. Beyond that status, they might appear to have
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347 U.S. 497 (1954).

2

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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little in common. Bolling, decided on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education,3
found unconstitutional federal laws providing for segregated schools in the District
of Columbia.4 McCulloch affirmed Congress’s power to create and charter a national
bank5 and denied the State of Maryland’s power to tax that bank. It is not obvious,
at first glance, that anything of consequence connects the two decisions.
Yet certain commonalities between Bolling and McCulloch shape our
understanding of a fundamental question regarding the American Constitution’s
original meaning:6 Does the Constitution contain a general equality norm that
constrains the federal government, as one of us has suggested?7 The question is
profound as a matter of interpretation and important as a matter of practice if one

3

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

See Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 77, § 35, 12 Stat. 394, 403; Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat.
407, 407. Strictly speaking, the statutes did not require segregated schools but rather assumed that
they would be segregated by providing separately for the education of “colored children.”
4

5

See Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, 4 Stat. 266.

The authors disagree somewhat on the interpretive force of the term “original meaning”—a
common phenomenon among originalists. See Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism
and the Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 149 (2012) (“The words
‘originalism’ and ‘originalist’ are ambiguous and used by scholars, lawyers, judges, and the public in
a variety of different ways”). All of us use the term “original meaning” to describe the meaning that a
hypothetical reasonable person in 1788 would have ascribed to the Constitution. See Gary Lawson &
Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006). Two of us give
“original meaning” primary place in constitutional interpretation. The other points out that lawyers
and courts of the Founding Era generally interpreted legal documents, such as constitutions,
according to the subjective understanding of the parties that entered into them, although in the
many cases in which that understanding was not recoverable or coherent, original public meaning
controlled. Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239 (2007). These intramural disputes do not affect the analysis
that we undertake in this article. As often (though by no means always) happens, in this particular
instance the various understandings of “originalism” converge to a common set of conclusions.
6

See Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1082-83,
1173-74 (2004).

7

2

regards the Constitution’s original meaning as relevant for action.8 It implicates
issues ranging from the facts of Bolling, to the permissibility of federal affirmative
action programs, to the ability of the federal government to make distinctions in
benefit programs on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. Doctrinally, the answer
to the question has been a resounding “yes” at least since Bolling was decided in
1954, and certainly since the line of modern cases that (mis?)reads Bolling as
effecting a “reverse incorporation” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality norm
that binds the states.9 But what about the answer as a matter of original meaning?
Does the Constitution really contain such a norm?
We believe that a principle that can plausibly, although with some important
qualification, be described as a general equality norm applicable to all institutions
of the national government derives from the Constitution’s original meaning. This
8
Many people believe that the Constitution’s meaning is at least one factor, or perhaps the
determinative factor, for guiding real-world adjudications. Larry Solum calls this the “constraint
principle,” Solum, supra note 6, at 154, and observes that “[a]lmost every originalist agrees that the
original meaning of the Constitution should make a substantial contribution to the content of
constitutional law.” Id. That is a contingently accurate description of current empirical reality,
but—as Solum correctly notes, see id. —there is nothing in originalism as a theory of meaning that
logically entails any position about originalism as a theory of adjudication. See Gary Lawson,
Originalism without Obligation, -- B.U.L. REV. – (2013). Claims about meaning are in the domain of
interpretative theory, while claims about appropriate action are in the domain of moral and political
theory. We suggest nothing in this article about the appropriate way, if any, to translate truths
about constitutional meaning into action. Even if one believes in some form of the constraint
principle, the relationship between interpretation and adjudication is much more complex than is
often recognized. See infra at --.

See Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 988-89 (2004). Scholars from David
Bernstein to Peter Rubin have noted that, doctrinally, Bolling makes much more sense as a
straightforward substantive due process case than as a vehicle for some kind of “reverse
incorporation” of the Fourteenth Amendment. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER
87-88 (2011); David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v.
Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1879 (2006). This seems right, though nothing in this article turns on how best to view Bolling
as a matter of doctrine.
9
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norm, however, stems from a different source and takes a different form than that
applied in Bolling, subsequent cases, and prior scholarly commentary.
Part I of this Article lays out the interpretative problem with trying to find
an equality norm in the Constitution applicable to the federal government from
scrutiny of the text alone. Part I then sets forth an alternative source of such a
norm: the fiduciary character of the Constitution and the rules of interpretation
that flow from that character. As explained in Part I, the Constitution’s grants of
power to federal actors and institutions are, in essence, grants to agents with
fiduciary obligations, and this fiduciary understanding was inherent in Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch.10
One of us has written elsewhere:

The Constitution should be read through a fiduciary lens. A central
purpose of the document was to adopt for America a federal
government whose conduct would mimic that of the private-law
fiduciary. Specifically, the purpose was to erect a government in which
public officials would be bound by fiduciary duties to honor the law,
exercise reasonable care, remain loyal to the public interest, exercise
their power in a reasonably impartial fashion, and account for
violations of these duties.11
Part I thus explains what it means to read the Constitution “through a fiduciary
lens”—in other words, how the character of the Constitution as an agency
instrument affects how the document should be interpreted
To be clear: We think that Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch provides an appropriate interpretative
framework because parts of it are well reasoned and identify objectively important features of the
Constitution, not because it was authored by John Marshall or was printed in the United States
Reports.
10

Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON,
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND
PROPER CLAUSE [hereinafter ORIGINS] 52, 52-53 (2010).
11

4

Finally, Part I raises the question whether fiduciary requirements govern all
the Constitution’s grants of power or only some of them—-specifically the Necessary
and Proper Clause.12 This latter question is highly relevant to Bolling, since
Congress’s power over the District of Columbia stems from the Enclave Clause13
rather than the Necessary and Proper Clause. In other words, if we disregard the
putative basis of the Bolling decision, then the result was correct as a matter of
original meaning only if the Constitution’s fiduciary principle governs power grants
other than the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Part II of this Article then explores the content of the fiduciary norms that
underlie the Constitution, in particular the norm by which agents (in this case,
officials of the federal government) must treat multiple principals or beneficiaries
(citizens) impartially. After surveying fiduciary law as it existed at the founding, we
show that the original meaning of the Constitution prescribes a general standard of
equality from which the government may depart where it can show reasonable
cause. But that is as specific a conclusion as we can reach: Eighteenth-century
fiduciary law was not precise enough to yield anything less general. That is why we
say that commonalities between Bolling and McCulloch “shape” our understanding
of the role of equality in the original Constitution. They do not necessarily provide

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally ORIGINS, supra note 11, passim (suggesting that the
word “proper” in that Clause was designed to communicate that laws authorized by the Clause must
comply with fiduciary standards).
12

13

See id. art. I,§ 8, cl. 17.
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concrete answers, especially if one has an unduly specific conception of what
answers to constitutional questions must look like.14
Finally, Part II explains that this presumptive requirement of equal
treatment applies to all federal power grants, not just to the Necessary and Proper
Clause.

Accordingly, Bolling was correctly decided—and quite easily correctly

decided—as a matter of original meaning.
In sum, the basic idea of “federal equal protection” has a firm grounding in
original meaning, though the precise content of the relevant principle is (we expect
to no one’s surprise) subject to considerable uncertainty. The original meaning of
“federal equal protection” thus recreates—or, temporally speaking, creates—many
of the puzzles that have plagued modern equal protection doctrine under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

I

A. The Misconceived(?) Quest for Federal Equal Protection

Almost no one doubts that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment15
imposes a general equality norm of some kind on the states. There is vigorous

There is no a priori reason to suppose that the Constitution’s original meaning always will yield
crisp, clear rules. The extent to which the Constitution prescribes highly specific answers is an
empirical, not a theoretical, question. Perhaps (though we are not convinced) only very specific
constitutional provisions are appropriate sources of law in adjudication, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989), but any such conclusion would have to
come from a theory of adjudication rather than from a theory of meaning or interpretation.
14
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disagreement about the scope and content of that norm, and even about which
portion of the Fourteenth Amendment contains it,16 but there is general agreement
that the Fourteenth Amendment contains some such equality norm, and we take
that proposition as given in this Article.
Bolling, however, imposed an analogous requirement of equal protection on
the federal government. Justifying this popular doctrine is often thought—albeit
much more often by nonoriginalists than by originalists—to pose a special challenge
for advocates of originalism.17
There is neither an “equal protection” nor a “privileges or immunities” clause
in the Constitution applicable to the federal government.18 Instead, there are a
number of clauses that mandate equal treatment in discrete contexts. Among these

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”).

15

Modern doctrine sees the Equal Protection Clause (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) as the font of a general equality principle. Some
originalists are inclined to see this provision as limited to the specific context of “protection” and
therefore not extending to the conferral of benefits, such as access to public educational facilities,
with a more general equality norm stemming instead from the Privileges or Immunities Clause (“No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States”). See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Mathews, Originalism and Loving v.
Virginia, 2012 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1393; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). We do not here engage any of those debates; our focus is on the
eighteenth century, not the nineteenth century.
16

See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 130 (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century,
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 (2002) (asserting Bolling’s “incompatibility with originalism”); Jeffrey
Rosen, Conservatives v. Originalism, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 471 (describing Bolling as “the
Achilles heel of originalism”).

17

Applicable to the federal government is the Privileges AND Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 1, which was designed to impose narrower rules. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117 (2009).
18
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are requirements of national uniformity for duties, imposts, and excises19 and for
naturalization and bankruptcy laws.20 The commerce and taxing powers are limited
by the qualification that “[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another . . . .”21 The
Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that Congress can implement that clause
only through “general Laws.”22 The Title of Nobility Clause,23 with its prohibition on
government-sponsored castes, is another equality provision. The prohibitions on
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws24 insure a level of generality in certain
kinds of measures. However, these are all specific requirements of equality in
specific circumstances. There is no express, overarching “equality” clause applicable
to federal institutions.
May one infer from these specific clauses some broader principle of equality
that informs our understanding of the rest of the instrument?

This kind of

maneuver from a set of clauses with a common theme to a deeper interpretative
principle is a familiar part of American constitutional lore: examples include John

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States”).
19

See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,
and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
20

21

Id. art. 1, § 9, cl. 6.

22

Id. art. IV, § 1.

See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States”). For an
engaging account of this neglected clause, see JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE
CONSTITUTION THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST CURIOUS PROVISIONS Ch. 8 (2011).
23

24

See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”).

8

Hart Ely’s attempted derivation of a principle of representation,25 Zephyr
Teachout’s attempted derivation of an anticorruption principle,26 Heidi Kitrosser’s
attempted derivation of a principle of substantive accountability,27 Gary Lawson’s
attempted derivation of a principle of decisional independence,28 William O.
Douglas’s attempted derivation of a right to privacy,29 and Roger Taney’s attempted
derivation of a “treat even free Blacks badly” principle.30 Given that one of us has
used (he thinks correctly) this sort of maneuver in the past, we are reluctant to
condemn all instances of it out of hand.
But this interpretive device must be used with great caution. After all, the
most obvious interpretative inference in the face of multiple related clauses
militates against this kind of interpretation: the specification of norms in certain
distinct areas but not in others ordinarily suggests that no broader principle is
intended.31 The more specific the instances—and the explicit equality-based
provisions in the Constitution are indeed highly specific—the less likely it seems
25

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). For a
spirited critique, see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizen’s United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (2012).
26

See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION (2013) (forthcoming).
27

See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making,
18 CONST. COMMENTARY 291 (2001).

28

29

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965).

30

See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411-12 (1856).

This norm is expressed in various rules of construction, of which the best known is Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius—“the expression of one is the exclusion of the other.” See ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107-11 (2012).
31

9

that there is some broader norm lurking in the background. Sometimes a cigar is
just a cigar. Sometimes a set of clauses with a common theme is just a set of clauses
with a common theme, whose interpretative meaning is exhausted by those clauses’
content.
Of course, it is possible that seemingly-related clauses are instantiations of a
wider principle and that the expression of the principle in certain areas but not
others is simply for emphasis or caution. In that case, though, there must be some
evidence of that wider principle beyond the bare existence of a set of clauses with a
common theme.32
One might find such evidence of an equality theme in the very nature of law.
Perhaps the concept of law itself encompasses at least a presumptive requirement of
equal treatment. The long history of acts of attainder, private bills, and special
interest legislation renders this a difficult argument to make. The Constitution
renders the argument even more difficult, because of the ways in which the
document uses the term “law.” In some instances, as in the phrase “due process of
law”33 and (perhaps) “common law,”34 the meaning seems to include expansive
norms. In most instances, however, when the Constitution uses the word “law,” it
means only a statute.35

Other than compliance with certain procedural

That is, there must be evidence to rebut the normal presumption, expressed in constructional
preferences such as the Expressio unius maxim, that the document does not impose the wider
principle.
32

33

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

34

Id. amend. VII.

35

E.g., id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 & § 7, cl. 2.

10

requirements for the enactment of legislation and with other portions of the
Constitution itself (such as the limits on federal power) nothing more is necessary to
a federal “Law.”
Alternatively, one might argue, as the Court did in Bolling, that a law
denying

equal

treatment

violates

the

Fifth

Amendment’s

prohibition

on

deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”36 Such an
argument, however, would apply only to actions effecting deprivations of life,
liberty, or property, not to all federal action. Nor is this a plausible interpretation of
the Due Process Clause, though to explain that point in depth would take us far
afield. Suffice to say that “substantive due process,” of which this would be a specific
application, may or not be a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—but it is not a plausible interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.37
All of the foregoing suggests that the Constitution contains no specific text or
set of texts that impose a general equality principle on the federal government.
This, in turn, suggests that from the standpoint of original meaning the conclusion
in Bolling was incorrect.
Except that there are other often-overlooked sources of constitutional
meaning that bear directly on this question.

36

Id. amend. V.

See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408
(2010).

37
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B. Founders and
Constitution

Fiduciaries:

Interpreting

the

Marshallian

Enter McCulloch v. Maryland. The specific issues decided in McCulloch shed
little light on the question before us, but Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, read for
its broader framework, provides two interpretative keys vital to understanding the
nature of the Constitution and the role that equality of treatment plays within it.
Chief Justice Marshall deploys neither key in quite the way that we think he should
have, but his analysis does suggest the correct path.
The first key lies within one of the most famous, and probably one of the most
misused, sentences in American constitutional history: “We must never forget, that
it is a constitution we are expounding.”38 Here is the context in which Marshall
wrote that sentence:
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a
bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument
which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied
powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and
minutely described . . . . A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by
which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a
legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires,
that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be
deduced from the nature of the objects themselves . . . . In considering this
question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.39
38

39

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
Id. at 408-09.

12

Marshall was explaining that the interpretative presumptions one should
apply depend in part on the kind of document one is construing. A constitution, said
Marshall, is likely to be general rather than specific, so it would be a mistake to
expect it to specify powers with much precision. Therefore, the absence of explicit
powers to establish banks or create corporations should not weigh heavily against
the existence of such powers. According to Marshall, one should interpret a
constitution with the understanding that those who adopted the instrument
intended to lay down general rules, not daily housekeeping details.
To thoughtful modern readers, Marshall’s observation about expected levels
of generality seems obviously wrong. It is true that, as Marshall noted, a
constitution detailed on many matters will be long, even if not necessarily “of the
prolixity of a legal code.” But there is nothing conceptually absurd or illegitimate
about constitutional prolixity. The Constitution of India is more than twenty five
times as long as the unamended U.S. Constitution and more than fifteen times as
long as the Constitution with its twenty seven amendments.40 State constitutions
are often much longer and more detailed than the federal Constitution.41

India’s
constitution
contains
117,369
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_the_length_and_breadth_of_Indian_constitution
2013).
The
American
Constitution
of
1788
contains
4,543
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_q_and_a.html (visited Apr.
with
all
twenty-seven
amendments
reaches
7,818
http://www.snopes.com/language/document/cabbage.asp (visited Apr. 15, 2013).
40

words,
see
(visited Apr. 15,
words,
see
15, 2013), and
words.
See

Alabama’s constitution exceeds 350,000 words, see http://voices.yahoo.com/the-alabama-stateconstitution-777-amendments-strong-103158.html (visited Apr. 15, 2013), though that number is
misleading because the constitution contains numerous provisions involving local government and
taxation. California’s constitution is eight times longer than the federal Constitution fairly and
41

13

In Marshall’s defense, it must be noted that the constitutions of his day did
tend to be rather short documents. The unamended U.S. Constitution contained
4543 words, the Articles of Confederation fewer than 3600, the longest state
constitution (Massachusetts) about 11,400, and the constitution and declaration of
rights of Virginia, Marshall’s own state, only about 3800. Moreover, it may be that
excessive length and detail reduce a document’s effectiveness as a constitution. Yet
that supra-optimal length would not render it a “non-constitution.”
What make Marshall’s observation more difficult to justify, even in the
contemporaneous context, are the variations in detail included in different parts of
the U.S. Constitution. There are a number of subjects—such as the presidential
selection procedures—on which the Constitution goes into very impressive detail.42
There are other topics, of course, on which the Constitution is either terse or silent.
But that means only that one cannot generalize about the expected degree of detail
in the Constitution either from theorizing about the nature of constitutions or by
making sweeping a priori judgments about this particular Constitution. One simply
has to look topic by topic to see what level of detail is actually provided.43

squarely. See http://pacificvs.com/2009/08/18/a-brief-history-of-the-california-constitution/ (visited
Apr. 15, 2013).
42

U.S. Const. art. II, section 1, cls. 2-6 (containing 475 words).

Thus, the real question for a case like McCulloch—and any other case—is more contextual than
Marshall’s discussion lets on: Given the particular scheme of enumerated congressional powers in
Articles I-V, does the absence of an enumerated power to incorporate a bank suggest that no such
power is included in the grant of authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution” other federal powers?” That is a difficult interpretative question, but
one is not advanced toward an answer by speculation about the specificity of constitutions.
Constitutions can be long or short, detailed or vague; and the same is true of particular provisions
within a constitution. The United States Constitution is, relatively speaking, on the short side, but
43

14

But if Marshall was wrong on his precise claim, he was profoundly right in
his broader point: one must never forget that it is a constitution—and not a
shopping list, a poem, an inspirational speech, a Biblical passage, or a novel—that
one is expounding. How one interprets a document is in some measure a function of
what kind of document one is interpreting. The guidelines that govern
interpretation of written instruments must be adapted to different categories of
instruments. Documents designed to convey information are written and
understood differently from documents designed to persuade, intrigue, or confuse.
Accordingly, they require somewhat different communicative conventions. The
powerful truth at the core of Marshall’s aphorism is that, in order to interpret the
Constitution correctly, one must first have some conception of what kind of
document one is interpreting.
The Constitution has been called many things. To recite only a few, it has
been called a “superstatute,”44 a “compact,”45 a “treaty,”46 a “corporate charter,”47 an

its attention to detail varies quite significantly across topics. How specific it is on any given subject is
an empirical, inquiry.
44

Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 390 (1981).

Edward A. Fallone, Charters, Compacts, and Tea Parties: The Decline and Resurrection of a
Delegation View of the Constitution, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2010). It must be noted
that Professor Fallone was describing the “compact” theory, not endorsing it. Indeed, he argues
roundly against it.
45

Francisco Forrest Martin, Our Constitution As Federal Treaty: A New Theory of United States
Constitutional Construction Based on an Originalist Understanding for Addressing a New World, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 269, 269 (2004).
46

Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
ORIGINS, supra note 11, at144, 147 (2010).
47
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“instruction manual . . . for a particular form of government,”48 “a principal symbol
of . . . the aspirations of the tradition,”49 and “a reflection of the tension between our
understanding of our present state and our understanding of social ideals toward
which progress is possible.”50

Some of these descriptions are closer and more

helpful than others, but none of them—including the description that two of us
suggested in 200651—is exactly on target.
The person who most aptly identified the Constitution’s character was James
Iredell.52 Iredell was the North Carolina jurist and state attorney general (and
later U.S. Supreme Court justice) who served as the chief spokesman for the
Constitution at his state’s ratifying convention. In the course of arguing that the
Constitution did not need to include a bill of rights (or at least a bill of rights more
extensive than the one appearing in Article I, section 9), Iredell said:
Of what use, therefore, can a bill of rights be in this Constitution,
where the people expressly declare how much power they do give, and
consequently retain all they do not? It is a declaration of particular
powers by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes.
It may be considered as a great power of attorney, under which no
power can be exercised but what is expressly[53] given. Did any man

Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism As a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47, 52
(2006).
48

Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
“Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 564 (1985).

49
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Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 816 (1989).

51

See supra note 47.

See Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE
WESTERN RES. L. REV. 243, 305 (2004).
52

The word “expressly” should not be interpreted to mean that Iredell did not believe that the
Constitution included implied powers. At the time, “expressly” could mean “not implied,” but it often
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ever hear, before, that at the end of a power of attorney it was said
that the attorney should not exercise more power than was there given
him? Suppose, for instance, a man had lands in the counties of Anson
and Caswell, and he should give another a power of attorney to sell his
lands in Anson, would the other have any authority to sell the lands in
Caswell?—or could he, without absurdity, say, “’Tis true you have not
expressly authorized me to sell the lands in Caswell; but as you had
lands there, and did not say I should not, I thought I might as well sell
those lands as the other.” A bill of rights, as I conceive, would not only
be incongruous, but dangerous.54
Iredell was making two points relevant to our discussion.55

First, and most

obviously, Iredell identified the Constitution as “a great power of attorney.” This is
essentially and profoundly correct. The Constitution is a grant of powers from a
principal, identified in the Preamble as “We the People of the United States,”56 to
various designees or agents.57 It has precisely the form, function, and feel of an
agency instrument. Powers of certain kinds—some defined more precisely than
meant “clearly.” See ROBERT G. NATELSON, THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION: WHAT IT ACTUALLY SAID
AND MEANT 206 (2d ed., 2011).
4 THE DEBATE IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 14849 (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 2d ed., 1907) (emphasis added).
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Neither one is the point that Iredell thought was most relevant—namely, the superfluity, and
indeed dangerousness, of a bill of rights. Whether Iredell was right about that point is beyond the
scope of this paper. One of us has elsewhere agreed with him that a bill of rights was mostly
superfluous. See Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICHMOND L. REV.
511 (1999). It is above our pay grade to determine whether the inclusion of a bill of rights in the
Constitution has done more harm than good.
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U.S. CONST. Preamble. The phrase is located in the position the grantor (the King) traditionally
held in royal charters granting powers and privileges. NATELSON, supra note 53, at 27.
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To be clear, we are making no claims that the Constitution actually, as a matter of political and
moral theory, worked an effective, normatively binding transfer of authority from “We the People” to
some set of governmental actors. Others have tried to use fiduciary theory to ground
constitutionalism, see, e.g., EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY
(2011), but that is not our project here. We are interested in constitutional meaning, not
constitutional authority. For purposes of ascertaining the meaning of the document, its pretension is
more important than its reality. The Constitution’s character helps determine what it means. That
character and meaning do not establish the truth or justice of any of its claims.
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others—are vested in different actors, whose attributes, duties, and limitations are
laid out with obvious and considerable care. To be sure, the Constitution does not fit
precisely the mold of traditional private-law agency instruments: the recipients of
power, such as Congress, the President, and the federal courts, are not literally
private-sector executors, factors, stewards, or guardians. But advocates of the
Constitution routinely described federal legislators and officials as “servants,”
“trustees,” and “agents;”58 and the overall operation of the Constitution, as a grant
of power from the principal to manage some measure of the principal’s affairs, is
starkly indicative of the agency character of the document. Combined with the
impressive background and contextual evidence indicating that constitutive
governmental instruments were seen in agency-law terms in the eighteenth
century,59 the most natural, and even obvious, reading of the Constitution treats it
as an entrustment of identified powers to identified agents, precisely as Iredell
described it.
An alternative account, not necessarily inconsistent with Iredell’s, sees the
Constitution as a corporate charter and government officials as corporate officers
and directors. As long as one does not try anachronistically to import modern
understandings of corporations or of the duties of corporate officers into the
eighteenth century,60 we do not think that much of substance changes if one
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See Natelson, supra note 11, at 55-57.

See generally Natelson, supra note 7; for a shorter account, see D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as
Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 708-13 (2013).
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Teddy Rave may have fallen prey to this anachronistic thinking in his intriguing comparison
between corporate law and the obligations of politicians. See Rave, supra note 58.
More
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analyzes the Constitution as a corporate charter rather than as a power of attorney.
In fact, there is considerable evidence that the founding generation, drawing upon a
rich tradition in both England and America, viewed governments as corporate
bodies.61

Moreover, corporate charters, like powers of attorney, represented a

delegation of enumerated authority (in this case, from the sovereign) to named
actors.
Yet we think that Iredell was closer to the mark. Here again McCulloch
proves instructive: If the Constitution had been “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by
the States, it would have had more of a corporate character. This is because it would
have

represented

a

delegation

by

public

authorities

of

some

of

their

responsibilities.62 But because the Constitution was, as Marshall wrote, “ordain[ed]
and establish[ed]”by “We the People” rather than by another governmental body,63
it seems closer to a power of attorney by which “We the People” entrust to the
government certain responsibilities.
Iredell’s the second point is that the Constitution’s character as a document
has implications for the interpretative presumptions that apply to it. Marshall, as

substantively, Mr. Rave devotes most of his attention to the supposed fiduciary obligations of state
governmental officials. Perhaps one can derive such obligations from individual state constitutions,
see Natelson, supra note 7, at 1134-36, but the federal Constitution does not constitute the state
governments, and it is thus difficult to view the federal Constitution as a source of state-officer
fiduciary duties.
See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Eric
Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origin of Limited Constitutional Government,
6 WASH U.J. L. & POL’Y 1 (2001); Miller, supra note 47, at 146-49.
61
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See Bilder, supra note 54, at 516-17.
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See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-05.
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we have seen, made the same point in McCulloch, even if his application of it was
based on a dubious generalization about expected levels of specificity in
constitutions. If the Constitution is a kind of power of attorney, it should be read as
though it were a power of attorney and not, for example, a poem or inspirational
speech. Both Iredell and Marshall were syllogistically correct to reason this way: (1)
Agency instruments should be construed using a standard set of interpretative
conventions for that class of documents, (2) the Constitution is an agency
instrument, so therefore (3) the Constitution should be construed using a standard
set of interpretative conventions for that class of documents.
The next question is: What are the interpretative conventions for powers of
attorney? Answering this question brings us to the second interpretative key from
McCulloch.
Agency instruments empower some people (agents) to act on behalf of other
people (principals) over the sphere of activity defined in the instrument. This offers
the benefits of specialization. It also entails the dangers of abuse: The dangers of
abuse derive from that fact that even the best agents do not always have perfect
knowledge, perfect motives, or perfect skills. The worst agents . . . well, the facts
appear throughout the course of human history.
Accordingly, a well-drafted agency instrument identifies the range of
activities over which the agents can exercise their authority, anticipates problems
that may arise during their representation of the principal, and specifies limitations
and constraints on those agents. To itemize such information in any given instance
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might well require something of the “prolixity of a legal code.” Nonetheless, because
of the relative stability of human nature, many of the same kinds of problems recur;
so the law of agency has developed certain default standards, principles, and rules.
In other words, the mere existence of the agency relationship triggers background
presumptions about the nature and scope of grants of power and about the
responsibilities and duties of agents. Because these are only default standards,
principles, and rules, the parties may alter them to fit the purpose of a particular
instrument.
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch is written as though it is blindingly obvious,
to Marshall and everyone else around him, that the Constitution is an agency
instrument that incorporated background presumptions familiar from other
fiduciary contexts. (Marshall himself had said as much during the ratification
debates.)64
Recall that Marshall issued his aphorism about expounding constitutions in
the context of determining whether Congress could charter a bank, even in the
absence of a specifically enumerated power to do so. “But,” he wrote, “there is no
phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes
incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be
expressly and minutely described.”65 Here Marshall was referring to the doctrine of
imcidental authority. This was the background principle of agency law whereby a
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See Natelson, supra note 7, at 1038, 1086 & 1159.
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17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
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grant of authority to an agent ordinarily carried with it implied, subordinate powers
that, although not specifically written in the instrument, were either necessary or
customary to effectuate the express (“principal”) powers.66 These implied
subordinate powers were referred to as incidental.
The precise range of incidental authority varied with the context. For
example, when a governing instrument was silent about whether a broker (then
usually called a factor) could sell on credit, he might in some circumstances be
permitted to sell on credit, but in other circumstances be limited to accepting cash.
A land manager (then usually called a steward) enjoyed incidental authority to
lease land in some circumstances, but not in others, when the governing instrument
was silent on the subject. A factor sent to negotiate a sale of goods did not have
authority to sell the principal’s entire business, even at a high price, unless the
agency instrument expressly granted that power. Similarly, a land steward could
make short-term rentals, but could not sell the fee simple without express
authorization.67

A conspicuous portion of the fiduciary jurisprudence governing

agents consisted of principles and rules defining what powers could be inferred as
incidental in various contexts.
Grants of power in agency instruments were read against these background
conventions. A full understanding of the scope of an agency required not just
reading the express (principal) powers listed in the instrument, but also considering
For a detailed discussion of the Founding-Era law of principals and incidents, see Natelson, supra
note 11, at 60-68.
66

67

See id. at 68.
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the law of incidental powers governing that instrument. In some cases, the parties
might vary the background law. For example, as Marshall noted in McCulloch, the
Articles of Confederation altered the baseline rule for construing such instruments
by specifying that no powers, however customary or useful, could be implied from
the express ones.68 In the absence of an express exception, however, agency law
provided the governing default rule.
Marshall applied such a default rule in McCulloch. Today, we remember his
treatment of congressional authority primarily for his interpretation of the word
“necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. But before Marshall reached that
stage of his analysis, he spent seven pages of United States Reports trying to prove
that the power to incorporate was a power of lesser dignity (that is, subordinate
to)69 those expressly enumerated in the Constitution.70 If the power to incorporate
was not of lesser dignity to the express powers to which it was allegedly attached,
then there was no way it could be incidental, no matter how causally essential it
might be to their execution.71
In his discussion, Marshall recognized the Necessary and Proper Clause for
what it was: a variation of a clause, very commonly found in agency agreements,
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (“Each state retains . . . every power, jurisdiction, and
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to this United States, in Congress
assembled”) (emphasis added).
68

The phrase most commonly used in the eighteenth-century jurisprudence was that a principal
was always “more worthy than” its incident. See Natelson, supra note 11, at 61.
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See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-21.

See generally Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2011) (discussing the
principal/incident distinction in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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that communicated to the reader that the parties were not opting out of the usual
rules of incidental authority. In this case, the clause affirmed that the agent
(Congress) enjoyed powers not specifically identified in the governing instrument,
but only if those powers were incidental to the enumerated, or principal, powers
granted.
For our purposes, it does not matter whether Marshall was correct to
conclude that the power to incorporate was incidental to some of Congress’s
enumerated powers. What does matter is that he applied standard agency
principles by inquiring whether the claimed power was subordinate to the
enumerated principal powers. The principal/incident distinction was a governing
background rule precisely because the Constitution was an agency instrument.72
Yet the background rules of agency law prevailing during the Founding Era
(like the background rules of agency law today) included far more than the doctrine
of incidental powers. They also imposed fiduciary obligations and limitations on
agents. If factors, executors, guardians, and trustees were presumptively subject to
an established set of fiduciary standards—and if the Constitution is an agency
document, to be interpreted under agency principles—does not the Constitution
impose on federal legislators and officials the same set, or at least a comparable set,
of standards?

Chief Justice John Roberts, writing nearly two centuries later, understood the same point. See
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (applying
Marshall’s principal/incident distinction). For analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ use of the principles
of McCulloch, see Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and the
Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1704-07 (2013).
72
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We think the answer is not simply yes, but obviously yes. In accordance with
the Whig theory prevalent at the time,73 when the Constitution granted power to
agents, it did so against the background of fiduciary law. Perhaps that law does not
apply in precisely the same fashion to government officials as it does to private
citizens, just as fiduciary standards vary somewhat among different kinds of private
fiduciaries. But the underlying principles—that agents must exercise their
authority with care, honesty, and attention to the interests of those who employ
them—are as much part of the Constitution as the basic principles of English
grammar. Federal officials are fiduciaries.
We have explained elsewhere in some detail how the Constitution applies
eighteenth-century fiduciary norms to federal executive and judicial actors.74 By
the time of the founding, English public law routinely applied such norms to
“executive” actors, a category that included judges. Specifically, the law imposed a
requirement that executive power be exercised in accordance with standards of
“impartiality, efficacy, proportionality, and regard for people’s rights.”75 The
Constitution’s grants of executive and judicial power in Articles II and III carried
with them the same standards. Two of us have called this the “principle of
reasonableness,” but this is really just a translation of standard fiduciary norms
into the public law context.
See Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
ORIGINS, supra note 11, at 84, 107, 109.
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Although the principle of reasonableness governed executive (and judicial)
actors, it did not apply directly to the British legislature—that is, to Parliament.76
This is because Parliament, unlike executive and judicial agencies, did not act
pursuant to delegated power. However, the American Congress does act pursuant to
delegated power: All the authority Congress possesses is delegated by “We the
People” through the Constitution.

Fiduciary principles are implicit in that

delegation.
We previously have demonstrated that the word “proper” in the Necessary
and Proper Clause refers to fiduciary standards: the use of “proper” clarifies that
laws enacted under the Clause must comply with those standards.77 That
conclusion is not relevant to Bolling v. Sharpe, because the statute at issue in that
case was not adopted under the Necessary and Proper Clause. But the conclusion
that fiduciary standards temper all federal powers matters a great deal Bolling v.
Sharpe. To see why, we first explain some aspects of the fiduciary law that infuses
the Constitution.

II

It is a bit misleading to speak of the “fiduciary law” of the Founding Era as
though it was a unified doctrine. “Eighteenth-century fiduciary law was somewhat

76

See id. at 134.
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See generally ORIGINS, supra note 11.
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fragmented, encompassing a wide spectrum of actors—administrators of estates,
attorneys (both public and private), bailiffs, executors, factors, guardians, servants,
stewards, and trustees.”78 Nonetheless, one could generalize across these different
contexts to deduce a common core of obligations imposed on all fiduciaries: the duty
to stay within the limits of granted authority, the duty to act with loyalty and in
good faith towards the principal, the duty of care, the duty to exercise personal
discretion rather than delegate authority to another agent, the duty to account to
the principal, and the duty to act impartially toward multiple principals.79 Any of
these duties could be altered, added to, or subtracted from by the terms of a specific
instrument, but they were the default norms governing agency relationships.
For our purposes, the most important of these baseline duties was the
fiduciary duty of impartiality. This was the requirement that one acting as a
fiduciary treat multiple beneficiaries in an impartial manner. For example, an
executor or trustee called upon to make distributions to a class of beneficiaries
generally could not discriminate unfairly among the beneficiaries. In an agency
context, the duty meant that an agent had to treat his principals in an impartial
manner.
There were many occasions in which a private agent might serve more than
one principal: for example, a factor might represent a consortium of merchants, or a
broker dealing with stock might owe duties both to the purchaser and to a secured
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lender. This is precisely the kind of multiple-principal agency arrangement created
by the United States Constitution. Two of us have elsewhere argued that, for
interpretative purposes, the principal who “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” the
Constitution must be viewed as a single hypothetical person.80 But that is because
of the nature of interpretation of jointly-authored documents. For purposes of trust
law, there is no need for fictions about hypothetical authors or principals. In that
context, “We the People” is plural (as indicated by the reference in the Preamble to
“ourselves”), and once the document is “ordain[ed] and establish[ed],” the principals
to be served by authorized government agents are real-life, concrete people.81 In
other words, the Constitution created a regime in which agents were empowered to
manage some portion of the affairs of multiple principals. This imposed on those
agents the fiduciary duty of impartiality.
How does this duty of impartiality require the agents to treat the principals
they serve? Must they treat all of them equally?
Eighteenth-century private law does not provide an answer as crisp as one
might like, but it does contain some illuminating suggestions. For our purposes, the
most illustrative cases form a line of English decisions extending from the
seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. These cases involve
exercises of powers of appointment under instructions to benefit named or described
80

See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 73, at 61-67.

How do we know that the instrument is established for the benefit of the people rather than for
the benefit of the agents themselves? Because the instrument tells us that its purposes are “to form
a more perfect Union, to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity . . . .” U.S. CONST. Preamble.
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persons, where those instructions left room for the power-holder to exercise
discretion. Those powers are somewhat analogous to the federal spending powers82
in that they involve authority to expend entrusted resources. This is a rather
important context when considering the actions of governments.
By the seventeenth century, it was well established that “[e]quity will in
many Cases control the unequal Acts of Trustees, Guardians, &c, though by the
Deed or Will they are vested with a discretionary or arbitrary Power.”83

For

example, in Gibson v. Kinven, a man left property by will to his wife “upon trust and
confidence that she would not dispose thereof but for the benefit of her children.”84
The wife left impressive gifts to two of the surviving children but left only five
shillings to the third child. That child sued to set aside the distribution although
nothing in the governing will specifically constrained the wife’s discretion. The
defendant children explained the disparity by observing that, “the plaintiff had by
some means disobliged her mother in her lifetime: and though they had endeavored
to reconcile them, and to persuade the mother to leave the plaintiff her daughter a
better legacy, yet they could not prevail with her to do it.”85 The case report tells us

We believe that the federal spending power comes from certain specific grants, such as the power
to “Error! Main Document Only.support Armies” and “maintain a Navy” (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cls. 12 & 13), and, as to grants that do not include such explicit authorization, from the Necessary
and Proper Clause rather than (as modern doctrine has it) from the Taxation Clause. See GARY
LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 26-32 (2004). For present purposes, the source of the spending power does not
matter, as long as such power exists somewhere.
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that the chancellor “decreed for the plaintiff; for that the distribution in this case
was so very unequal, and that without any good reason shewn to warrant it; and
therefore he thought fit to rectify it in this case, and could not do it otherwise than
by decreeing an equal distribution.”86
A case decided five years before, Craker v. Parrott, had been to the same
effect;87 and four years after Gibson, equity claimed jurisdiction to intervene in the
exercise of a similar power of appointment. That case, Wall v. Thurbane,88 appears
to have settled before decision.
Equity continued to review for potential unfairness in exercises of even openended powers of appointment. The cases to that effect, from Gibson v. Kinven
forward, were exhaustively collected and analyzed in 1801 in Kemp v. Kemp,89 by a
judge who openly declared that he did not want to have to intervene in such matters
but felt compelled by longstanding precedent to do so.90
Equity similarly imposed a duty of impartiality outside the context of powers
of appointment. Thus, when a factor represented multiple principals and the buyer
failed to pay, the principals had to share the loss equally:
One and the same factor may act for several Merchants, who
must run the joynt risque of his actions . . . ; as if five Merchants shall
remit to one Factor five distinct Bales of Goods, and the Factor makes
86
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one joynt Sale of them to one Man, who is to pay one moiety down, and
the other at six Months end; if the Vendee breaks before the second
payment, each man must bear an equal share of the loss . . . .91
From such cases, we might conclude that the duty of impartiality always
required equal treatment of beneficiaries or principals. But this is not quite true.
Instruments at issue in later cases seemed to give the power-holder broader
authority than that enjoyed in the Gibson and Craker cases. 92 After some balking,93
the courts began to honor this language by, in proper instances, upholding unequal
distributions.
Thus, in Burrell v. Burrell,94 a wife charged by a testamentary power of
appointment to provide her children “such fortune as she should think proper or
they deserve,”95 made only token provision for a son who already had a substantial
income as result of past actions by the original testator. The court held that she
“had executed the power [of appointment] very properly, considering the provision

3 CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET NAVALI, OR A TREATISE OF AFFAIRS MARITIME AND
COMMERCE 466 (7th ed., 1722).
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Drafters were always free to authorize, or even mandate, unequal treatment of beneficiaries. For
example, when a power of appointment authorized distribution “to one or more of the children then
living, in such manner as his wife, whom he had made executrix, should think fit,” Thomas v.
Thomas, 23 Eng. Rep. 928 (1705) (emphasis added), it was permissible to make the entire
distribution to one child, because while “an unreasonable and indiscreet disposition may be
controlled by a Court of Equity . . . , it is expressly provided, that she might give all to one.” Id.
Subsequent case law made clear that language of this sort was both necessary and sufficient to allow
full dispositions to one member of the potential beneficiary class. See Kemp, 31 Eng. Rep. at 895.
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which the son was entitled to . . . .”96

In other words, if the instrument and

underlying facts offered good reason to do so, in some circumstances even wildly
unequal treatment was proper. When enforcing such instruments, as the court
explained in Kemp, the law presumed merely that each beneficiary should receive
something substantial, or not “illusory,”97 but not necessarily something equal to the
other beneficiaries.98
This is not a surprising result: Not only had the creator of the instrument
emphasized the breadth of the power-holder’s discretion, but a strict focus on
equality raises the age-old problem of defining the dimensions along which equality
is going to be measured. Does giving every beneficiary the same amount constitute
equal treatment when one of those beneficiaries already has an enormous income
from prior actions of testator? It depends on what is being measured as equal or
unequal. Moreover, the law was not concerned with seemingly inequitable
distributions in the abstract but with seemingly inequitable distributions for which
there was no good cause, no apparent reason. As the rule was expressed in 1706,
where a power is given to make distributions to children, the holder of the power of
appointment “must divide it amongst them equally, unless a good reason can be
given for doing otherwise.”99 Later cases also emphasized the importance of giving
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reasons for seemingly unequal or unfair treatment,100 though by 1801 at least one
judge (concededly hostile to the entire line of cases) doubted whether equality was
the proper baseline,101 maintaining instead that “it is perfectly clear . . . , if some
very good reason does not appear . . . for giving a very small sum to one, such a
disposition cannot be allowed.”102
Thus, the essence of the law was that unexplained or unjustified unfairness
in the distribution of assets was a violation of an agent’s fiduciary duty, even when
the instrument granted the agent seemingly limitless discretion. Under certain
circumstances, fairness and equality overlapped, such as when unequal treatment
(however “unequal” was defined in that context) was per se unfair. Indeed, when no
better result was obvious, equal treatment was the default rule. But in other
circumstances, fairness required some accommodation to everyone, although not
necessarily the same accommodation.
Convenience justifies fixing as a baseline a presumption of equality of
distribution of burdens (as in the case of merchants who suffered losses from
nonpayment) or benefits (as in the distribution of assets under a power of
appointment). However, the courts permitted deviations from the baseline when
good reasons supported a deviation. The result was a judicial requirement of fair or
See Kemp, 31 Eng. Rep. at 893 (“the point is whether, under such a power she could make such
[unequal] distribution; assigning no reason for so doing. For that there is no authority.”) (argument
of counsel).

100
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reasonable treatment. This might or might not translate into a requirement of equal
treatment, depending upon circumstances.
During the period before the founding, the same themes appeared in public
sector agency law. The seminal decision was Rooke’s Case,103 about which two of us
have written elsewhere.104

A statute gave sewer commissioners power to make

repairs to water-control utilities “as case shall require, after your wisdoms and
discretions.”105 The costs were to be assessed on affected landowners as the
commissioners “shall deem most convenient to be ordained.”106 In Rooke’s Case, the
commissioners had assessed all of the costs of repair to a river bank on one
landowner, despite the fact that “divers other Persons had Lands to the Quantity of
800 Acres within the same level, and subject to Drowning, if the said bank be not
repaired . . . .”107

As reported by Sir Edward Coke, the court ruled that the

commissioners exceeded their authority, even though the statute seemed to give
them unlimited discretion to assess repair costs as they saw fit: “[N]otwithstanding
the Words of the commission give Authority to the commissioners to do according to
their Discretions, yet their Proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the Rule
of Reason and law.”108 As no reason was evident why just one landowner should
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bear the entire cost of repair, the assessment was invalid. Rooke’s Case noted that
the applicable statutes required equality, which, it observed was consistent with the
equitable law of bankruptcy,109 so that “the commissioners ought to tax all who are
in danger of being damaged by the not repairing equally.”110
Equality of treatment also played a significant role in Keighley’s Case111 in
1609, eleven years after Rooke’s Case. In Keighley, the commissioners again sought
to place the entire burden of keeping a wall in good repair on one landowner, while
the court ruled that the commissioners “ought to tax all persons who hold any lands
or tenements . . . according to the quantity of their land . . . .”112 Here a particular
measure of equality—payment in accordance with amount of land—was put forward
as the explicit baseline. Thus, Keighley went beyond holding that one landowner
should not have borne the entire burden; it further held that all landowners should
have borne their proportionate burdens.
Rooke’s Case and Keighley’s Case demonstrate that, as early as the sixteenth
century the courts were applying fiduciary standards to public officials somewhat
comparable to those imposed on private agents.113 If this public fiduciary law was
part of the background against which the Constitution was “ordain[ed] and
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establish[ed]”—and we think it more than clear that it was—then what does it tell
us about the obligations of federal government officials operating under a “great
power of attorney”?
It is easy to say that executive and judicial actors, who, like the English
sewer commissioners, exercise delegated, implementational power, are bound to
exercise their discretionary authority with care, loyalty, and impartiality.114 Does
the obligation of “impartiality” require equal treatment of all beneficiaries (or, in
the agency context, principals) along all possible understandings of equality? Of
course not. But it does mean that executive and judicial actors have to explain why
they are treating people as they do whenever the reasons for the different treatment
are not obvious. Equality of treatment is a plausible baseline from which to begin.
One can deviate from that baseline in certain circumstances, or even decide that a
different baseline is appropriate, but one will need reasons for so doing. The
President does not, for example, need to commit law enforcement resources in a
manner proportional to population. But if he varies from the requirement of a rough
equality, he should be able to show reasonable cause for doing so. An allocation
grossly unequal in some important respect (favoring, let us say, Chicago over
Houston) requires some explanation.
Is the same true of legislation? There is no obvious reason why not. Members
of Congress are fiduciary agents just as presidents and federal judges are. They, too,
exercise delegated power, and only delegated power, derived from the principal who
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empowered them: “We the People.” Accordingly, they owe fiduciary duties to the
principals whose affairs they manage. Once again, equality should serve as a
baseline, and deviations from the baseline should be supported by reasonable cause.
Thus, it is partly misleading to say that the fiduciary obligations of federal
officials under the Constitution include a duty to provide “equal protection.” That
formulation suggests concrete conceptions of equality that must be strictly followed.
Instead, one perhaps should speak of “fair protection,” or perhaps even more
accurately “reasoned protection.” The fundamental obligation of the fiduciary is not
always to treat beneficiaries or principals in equal circumstances equally, but not to
treat them unequally without good reason. There are contexts in which unequal
treatment is prima facie, or even per se, unreasonable, and in those circumstances
the requirement of “reasoned protection” folds into one of “equal protection.” But
those will be special cases of the broader principle.
In what sort of context might fiduciary obligations require equal treatment?
The obvious answer is, “Contexts in which the stated (or unstated) grounds for
distinction proposed by the agent are not supported by any reasonable cause.” For
example, when the purpose of a will that includes a power of appointment is to
effectuate the presumed intent of the testator, there is reasonable cause for
differential distributions under the will’s power of appointment when the testator
himself already provided one of the children with a large income. There is no
reasonable cause, however, for differential distributions because one of the children
has “disobliged” the person making the appointment, where the purpose of the
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distribution was to effectuate the presumed intent of the deceased father. Some
reasons simply do not make sense in the context of particular agency
relationships.115 The fact that one cannot give precise or determinate content to
this norm does not mean that the norm has no force or cannot be applied. It may
well result in some very difficult cases, but that is why judges and lawyers are paid.
There are some easy cases as well. Does it make any sense for government
officials to discriminate on the basis of race? In Plessy v. Ferguson,116 a majority of
the Supreme Court thought so—finding segregation, allegedly without disparate
treatment, to be “reasonable.” In reaching that conclusion, however, the majority of
the Justices not only disingenuously denied that segregation was designed as a
badge of black inferiority, but they also were notably deficient in identifying
allegedly reasonable bases for separation of the races. The reasons they did offer
were “the established usages, customs and traditions of the people”117 (without
noting that strict segregation in the South was a fairly new, post-bellum
phenomenon) and “comfort, and the preservation of the public peace, and good
order” (thereby making the bigotry of some principals a justification for punishing
other principals).

Context matters. To use a farcical example, would it be unreasonable for someone exercising a
power of appointment to deny a beneficiary a share because that beneficiary was a vegan? That
might depend on the presumed intent of the person creating the instrument. For example, suppose
the person creating the instrument had made his fortune from operating a slaughterhouse?

115

116

160 U.S. 537 (1895).

117

Id. at 550.

38

On the other hand, one might think of circumstances where disparate racial
treatment made sense. It would not, for example, be irrational to deny an FBI agent
a potentially career-advancing undercover assignment because the agent is black
and the assignment calls for infiltrating the Aryan Nation. Moreover, some have
argued that it is reasonable for a state prison system to segregate prisoners by race
when necessary to control gang violence.118 Still others have contended that racial
discrimination is permissible to create a racially diverse environment in institutions
of higher learning.119 But the latter instances plumb the outer boundaries of
plausible arguments. In the overwhelming majority of cases, it will be next to
impossible to find any good reasons for that kind of discrimination. Indulging in it
would appear to be a clear violation of the fiduciary duty of government agents.
Is there a wider range of circumstances in which the federal government
would have good cause to discriminate on the basis of sex rather than race? On the
basis of sexual orientation? On the basis of wealth? If the presumptive requirement
of fiduciary law is equal treatment of principals/beneficiaries, it is hard to see how
one could avoid asking these kinds of questions. To answer them, of course, requires
knowing some things that are very difficult to know: What counts as
“reasonable cause” for an action? Do reasons for actions have to be tailored to
individual circumstances or may they be based upon generalizations? If the latter,
how accurate do those generalizations need to be? What classes of people are
appropriate for generalizations? How compelling do the government’s reasons for
118
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actions have to be in different circumstances? Do those reasons need to have the
same force regardless of the basis for the differential treatment and regardless of
the characteristics of the people burdened and benefited by the action?

Does

discrimination on the basis of race require a stronger, weaker, or identical strength
of reason than discrimination on the basis of sex? Do the reasons require the same
force when one is considering (a) the administration of benefit programs, (b) the
operation of a prison system, or (c) the management of the military? What would a
jurisprudence involving judicial enforcement of this kind of fiduciary duty look like?
We have seen how differences in the wording of instruments induced the
English courts to be more or less tolerant of inequities of treatment. Is the same
true of different provisions in the Constitution? For example, if a constitutional
provision contains one sort of “equal protection” provision (such as the requirement
that bankruptcy laws be uniform), does that suggest that other kinds of equality
standards are not to be added? Suppose the history behind a provision suggests that
discriminatory treatment was expected? The Commerce Clause was adopted with
the understanding that it would permit Congress to lay discriminatory regulations
against certain goods. Should that make a difference? In Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause cases, courts give heighted protection to racial groups
precisely because of that Clause’s central purpose and history.
We do not intend even to begin to answer this list of questions. Instead, we
want to emphasize three features of the list. First, it recreates almost perfectly the
set of questions raised (if not always directly addressed) by modern equal protection

40

doctrine.120 The original “federal equal protection” doctrine found in the
Constitution of 1788 is likely to give rise to the same kinds of problems,
conundrums, and value choices with which the law has wrestled for a century and a
half when trying to understand the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, while the questions are likely to be very similar under the federal
fiduciary and Fourteenth Amendment “equal protection” doctrines, it is not at all
certain that the answers will always be the same. The Constitution did not create
the state governments and therefore, in most instances, does not function as a
“great power of attorney” with respect to the States.121 Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection doctrine springs from the text of a particular constitutional
amendment rather than from the general fiduciary character of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the interpretive rules that accompany the Constitution and create a
presumptive requirement of equal treatment by federal officials, do not necessarily
apply to questions involving the States.
Perhaps, at the end of the day, there will be substantial overlap between the
fiduciary constraints on imposed on federal agents and the Fourteenth Amendment
constraints imposed on state agents, but there is no a priori reason to expect them
to be identical. Chief Justice Warren in Bolling wrote that “it would be unthinkable
Compare our list of questions to the summary of equal protection law found in a leading
constitutional law casebook. See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVEN G. CALABRESI, MICHAEL W.
MCCONNELL & SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1511-12 (2010).
120
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that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government”122 than it imposes on the States. To the contrary, because the “equal
protection” constraints on the two levels of government stem from independent
constitutional sources, it is eminently thinkable that the federal government might
have a lesser, or even a greater, duty in some circumstances than do the States.123
Third, questions about the character of a jurisprudence that takes fiduciary
duties seriously involve issues different from those we have discussed. Our focus
has been on discerning constitutional meaning, and we have no trouble saying that
the federal Constitution means that federal government officials must have
plausible reasons when discriminating among classes of citizens. That is no more
difficult than saying that a trustee needs to have good reasons for his or her actions
when he or she treats some beneficiaries more favorably than other beneficiaries, or
that an agent must have good reasons for discriminating among principals. The
strength of the required reasons will vary with context, but an utterly arbitrary
action by a fiduciary that discriminates among beneficiaries or principals is always
a breach of duty. The Constitution imposes a similar rule on federal actors, unless
one can discern specific contexts in which that general requirement does not
apply.124 But determining how, or even whether, to translate that meaning into
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real-world constitutional doctrine requires a completely different kind of inquiry
than we have undertaken here.
The move from meaning to real-world doctrine requires a theory about a very
complex relationship between what a document means and how people should
behave. Many people assume that once the Constitution’s meaning is discerned, it
follows naturally that political actors, such as judges, should act in accordance with
that known meaning.

As one of us has emphasized to tedium, however, that is an

assumption far less inevitable than widespread.125
Propositions about constitutional meaning are factual statements whose
truth or falsity is determined by the tools of interpretative theory, while
propositions about constitutional doctrine, which purport to dictate appropriate
conduct, are normative claims whose truth or falsity must be determined by
political and moral theory. Evidence that supports one kind of claim may or may not
support other kinds of claims.

Even assuming that constitutional meaning is

relevant to constitutional action, it is far from obvious that adjudication either can
or should directly apply what one regards as the correct theory of constitutional
meaning (whatever that theory may be). Adjudication takes place in real time, with
limited resources. Anyone who says that there is no price tag on justice understands
neither price tags nor justice. It is virtually inevitable that any sensible, workable

Times: Common Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U.L. REV. 289, 309 (2007). But one must go where the
evidence leads, and that is where the evidence leads.
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system of adjudication will adopt shortcuts, or rules of thumb, for dealing with
recurring situations, which almost certainly means that some decisions that are
adjudicatively “correct” will be interpretatively “wrong,” simply because getting the
interpretatively “correct” answer would be too costly.126 A theory of adjudication
probably cannot follow in a straight line from a theory of interpretation even if the
conceptual and normative gap between meaning and adjudication can be bridged.
Thus, we present here no theory about the appropriate way to translate
constitutional meaning into constitutional adjudication. We conclude only that the
Constitution’s meaning includes fiduciary obligations on federal officials; we do not
say whether courts can or should enforce those obligations in any particular fashion.
In the end, we do not believe that the Constitution prescribes precise and
detailed answers to what constitutes “reasonable cause,” any more than the law of
trusts provides precise and detailed answers to every question of how to execute a
power of appointment. We maintain only that the original Constitution poses those
questions. If one wants to call those questions, and the need of governmental
fiduciaries to answer them in the course of executing official duties, a species of
“federal equal protection,” we do not object strongly to that label. And if one wants
to describe the process of discerning the character and strength of the needed
reasons for action as a “moral reading”127 or “philosophical approach”128 to
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constitutional interpretation, we do not object strongly to those labels either. We
think, however, that “fiduciary approach” better describes the required inquiry.
This is because our focus is on the distinctively legal content of fiduciary
understandings that underlie the Constitution’s meaning, rather than on some
abstract moral or political theory.
All of which brings us back to the facts of Bolling v. Sharpe. We cannot see
any good reason why schools in the District of Columbia should have been
segregated by race. Access to government facilities is precisely the sort of thing that
seems to call for a presumption of equal access by all beneficiaries. Race does not
rebut that presumption when the disadvantaged people are among the principals to
whom agencies owe duties of impartiality. If Congress is bound by fiduciary duties
when legislating for the District of Columbia, and if constitutional meaning should
drive constitutional decision making, Bolling is quite an easy case to decide.
Were Congress acting pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause, we
would have no trouble saying that that clause incorporates the background rules of
fiduciary duty and forbids discrimination based on race. But Congress in Bolling
did not act pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. It acted pursuant to the
Enclave Clause, which authorizes Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by
Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States . . . . ”129 Do fiduciary duties apply to Congress

129

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

45

only through the Necessary and Proper Clause, or do they apply as background
principles through the law of agency?
In previous work, one of us has said the former,130 but he now thinks that is
mistaken, for the reasons that we have already given. The Necessary and Proper
Clause confirms and clarifies the agency-law character of the Constitution as it
applies to Congress, but it does not create or exhaust that character. Members of
Congress are agents, just as are executive and judicial officials. They are fiduciaries,
just as are executive and judicial officials. That is true whether they are legislating
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the District Clause, or the Weights and
Measures

Clause.131

This

conclusion

is

strengthened

by

ratification-era

representations from the Constitution’s advocates that the Necessary and Proper
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Clause was a mere recital of rules that would have been implicit in the Constitution
in any event.132
If Congress wants to treat people in the District of Columbia differentially, it
is not categorically forbidden from so doing, any more than holders of unlimited
powers of appointment are forbidden categorically from giving different amounts to
beneficiaries. But Congress, like other kinds of trustees, needs reasonable cause for
that action, and in the case of Bolling, reasonable cause was nowhere to be found.
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